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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

:

Case No. 920104

s

JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant

: Category No. 2
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to criminal
homicide, murder in the first degree, a violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-202 (1990).

In exchange for such plea, the State dismissed

a second count of aggravated burglary and agreed not to ask for the
death penalty. Defendant's plea was entered conditionally pursuant
to State v. Serv, 759 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to preserve his
right to appeal from a pretrial order concerning the legal standard
applicable to the defense of involuntary intoxication.

He was

sentenced to life imprisonment.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The only issue on appeal is:
determine

the

legal

standard

involuntary intoxication?

Did the trial court properly

applicable

to

the

defense

of

Standard of Review:

This Court accords the trial court's

conclusions of law no deference but reviews them for correctness.
Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992):
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute
or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the
offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.
(2) ...
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily
consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not
excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental
illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect
that substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, or
behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be a congenital
condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a
physical or mental disease and includes, but is not limited
to, mental retardation. Mental illness does not mean a
personality or character disorder or abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal conduct.
(5) ...
Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-306 (1990):
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the existence
of the mental state which is an element of the offense;
however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes
an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk
because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
Utah Code Ann.# § 76-5-202 (1990):
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the
death of another under any of the following circumstances:

2

(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was
engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit,...aggravated
burglary...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 25, 1990, the State of Utah filed an information
against defendant, charging him with criminal homicide, murder in
the first degree, a capital offense

(R. 5) .

Thereafter, on

September 5, 1991, the State filed an amended information adding a
second count of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony (R. 66) .
On September 5, 1991, defendant entered pleas of not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity (R. 68-73).
Based upon representations by defense counsel that the defense
would be involuntary intoxication based upon the ingestion of the
prescription drug Prozac, the State filed a Motion for Pre-trial
Determination

of

Legal

Standard

Re: Defense

of

Involuntary

Intoxication (R. 85-87), together with a supporting memorandum of
points and authorities (R. 88-102).
On

November

21,

1991,

defendant

filed

a

Request

for

Declaratory Judgment Re: Involuntary Intoxication (R. 159-164),
joining the State's request for a pretrial determination of the
applicable legal standard.
A

hearing

was

held

on November

26, 1991, after which

additional memoranda were filed by the parties concerning the
applicable legal standard (R. 176-181, 193-201).
On January 8, 1992, the trial court issued its Order Re: Legal
Standard Applicable to Defense of Involuntary Intoxication (R. 2423

243 contains original order with typographical error, which is
reproduced in Appendix 2 of defendant's brief; the typographical
error was not noted until after defendant filed his brief).

The

trial court's corrected order is contained in the supplemental
record filed with this Court on November 9, 1992.

A copy of the

motion, stipulation and corrected order are attached hereto as
Addendum A,
Because no hearing was ever held or testimony ever received
concerning whether defendant would qualify factually or legally for
an involuntary intoxication defense, the trial court's order listed
principles

applicable

to

voluntary

intoxication

as

well

as

involuntary intoxication.
On January 10, 1992, defendant pled guilty to Count I,
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, pursuant to the
Statement of Defendant and Plea Agreement which he signed in open
court (R. 267-276) .

According the terms of the agreement, the

State dismissed Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and further agreed
that it would not seek the death penalty.

Defendant's plea was

entered conditionally to preserve for appeal the issue concerning
the legal standard

applicable to the defense of involuntary

intoxication which was the subject of the trial court's ruling (R.
271) .
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 285-286).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of July 22, 1990, defendant
unlawfully entered the apartment of Janice Fondren in St. George,
4

Utah, and killed her with a 9 mm, pistol
thereafter

charged

with

first

degree

(R. 268) .

murder

and

He was

aggravated

burglary,
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled that involuntary intoxication
leading to a temporary mental illness can constitute a defense if
brought within Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992) , which by its
very terms governs all mental illness defenses in Utah.

That

statute specifically excludes from the defense any mental illness
brought about through voluntary intoxication, but does not so
exclude involuntary intoxication.

The trial court's ruling is

consistent with the statute and with authority that the mental
state of an involuntarily intoxicated defendant is measured by the
test of legal insanity.
The trial court properly ruled that "irresistible impulse," or
inability to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law, is
no longer a defense under Utah law.

The Legislature specifically

repealed irresistible impulse as a mental illness defense in 1983,
as

did

the

legislatures.

United

States

Congress

and

a

number

of

state

Had the trial court instructed that irresistible

impulse was a defense, it would have constituted error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER CORRECTLY INCORPORATES
THE PRINCIPLES OF UTAH LAW APPLICABLE TO THE
DEFENSE OF INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION.
It is important at the outset to point out that the trial
5

court's order deals only with the legal standard for involuntary
intoxication which would apply should the defendant factually and
legally qualify for it.

There are a variety of factual issues

which were never addressed at the trial court level, including the
following: to what extent, if any, defendant may have actually
ingested any prescription drug, either alone or in combination with
other substances prior to the crime; whether any such drugs in fact
affected his behavior in any way; whether, if he took such drugs,
they were taken under the direction of a physician; whether, if
they were so taken and he were rendered intoxicated by them, such
would

render

his

intoxication

"involuntary";

and

like

considerations. The State points this out as an initial matter so
that the Court understands that the State in no way accepts the
premise that defendant would qualify either factually or legally
for an involuntary intoxication defense if the case went to trial.
The State's consistent position throughout the proceedings below
has been that these are open questions which would be the subject
of further hearings and the production of evidence before any
determination could be made (R. 193-201).
This case is therefore before the Court solely on the issue of
the trial court's interpretation of Utah law as it pertains to the
defense of involuntary intoxication. In other words, assuming for
the purpose of argument that defendant could otherwise qualify for
an involuntary intoxication defense, what is the proper legal
standard which would govern it?
Since the Utah Criminal Code contains no specific defense of
6

involuntary intoxication, the State raised the issue early in the
proceedings, and defendant agreed that it would be to the benefit
of all parties to have the legal issue resolved at the outset. The
trial court properly ruled on the legal standard which would apply
in such circumstances, as explained below.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION LEADING TO
A TEMPORARY MENTAL ILLNESS CAN CONSTITUTE A DEFENSE IF BROUGHT WITHIN THE
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305.

The trial court correctly ruled that involuntary intoxication
leading to a temporary mental illness can constitute a defense in
Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305

(Supp. 1992) provides in part as

follows:
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under
any statute
that the defendant, as a result of
mental illness, lacked the mental state required
as an element of the offense charged.
Mental
illness is not otherwise a defense.
(3) A person who is under the influence of
voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled
substances, or volatile substances at the time of the
alleged offense is not excused from criminal
responsibility on the basis of mental illness.
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease
or defect that substantially impairs a person's
mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning....
(emphasis added).
By its very terms, then, section 76-2-305 governs all mental
defenses in Utah.

The trial court addressed the question of

whether involuntary intoxication leading to a temporary mental
illness could constitute a defense, notwithstanding the absence of

7

a specific statute in Utah covering involuntary intoxication.
While section 76-2-305(3) specifically excludes from the defense
any mental illness brought about through voluntary intoxication, it
does not rule out involuntary intoxication as a defense under the
statute.

Thus, involuntary intoxication is still available as a

defense under the mental illness defense statute, provided the
defendant can bring forth evidence that such intoxication was in
fact involuntarily induced.
Involuntary intoxication is generally recognized as a defense
in instances where a defendant is rendered temporarily insane due
to the ingestion of prescription medication taken under the
direction of a physician. See Involuntary Intoxication as Defense,
73 A.L.R.3d 195, 214-216 (1976).
An accused who is unable to form the statutory mental state
due to either mental illness or involuntary intoxication leading to
temporary mental illness can avail himself of the defense under
section 76-2-305. To the extent such a defendant does not form the
mental state to commit the crime, he is not blameworthy.

This

applies equally to defendants who are mentally ill and those whose
mental

derangement

is

caused

by

involuntary

intoxication.

Defendant's claim that he should be allowed to assert a defense
standard different from and more favorable to him than that
applicable to other mental illness defenses is not supported by
authority.
Several other states, which, like Utah, have no statutory
defense of involuntary intoxication, recognize it as coming within
8

their general insanity statutes as a type of temporary insanity.
People v. Wilkins. 459 N.W.2d 57 (Mich, 1990); Jones v. State. 648
P.2d 1251, 1258 (Okl.Cr. 1982),
Criminal

Law

1005

(3d

ed.

See also R. Perkins & R. Boyce,
1982)

(involuntary

intoxication

establishes that the accused's "derangement is without culpability
and hence is to be dealt with the same as if it were the result of
mental disease or defect")
Federal decisions have also recognized that "the mental state
of an involuntarily intoxicated defendant is measured by the test
of legal insanity."

United States v. F.D.L.. 836 F.2d 1113, 1116

(8th Cir. 1988).
"To establish an involuntary intoxication defense it must not
only be proven that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated,
but also that because of his intoxication he was rendered legally
insane during the time he committed the offense."

73 A.L.R.3d at

204.
As indicated, the defense of insanity in Utah is governed by
section 76-2-305. A brief historical overview of the evolution of
the defense of mental disease or defect helps put the present
statute into perspective.
In 1973, the Utah Legislature for the first time codified the
defense of insanity, and provided as follows:
In any prosecution for an offense, it
shall be a defense that the defendant at
the time of the proscribed conduct, as
a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law.
9

Former § 76-2-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-305).
This was a codification of the Model Penal Code formulation
for insanity, and was consistent with the former common law
standard,

as

a

combination

of

the

M'Naghten

test

and

the

"irresistible impulse" test. State v. Domincruez. 564 P.2d 768, 770
(Utah 1977).
The M'Naghten rule, established in England in 1843, provided
that:
to establish a defence on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
10 CI. & F. 200, 3 Eng.Reprint 718 (1843).
The M'Naghten standard has been widely applied throughout the
United States, either through case law decisions or through state
statutes.
In

1983,

the

Utah

M'Naghten/"irresistible

Legislature

impulse"/Model

explicitly
Penal Code

rejected

the

standard by

repealing and reenacting section 76-2-305 in its present form. The
standard now focuses exclusively on the defendant's mens rea, that
is, whether the defendant lacked the mental state required as an
element of the offense charged.
The Legislature simultaneously enacted "guilty and mentally
ill" provisions which may apply to defendants who were mentally ill
at the time of the offense but who nonetheless were able to form
the mental state set out in the statute. Utah Code Ann.
10

§ 77-35-

21,5 (1982) (repealed effective July 1, 1990; currently contained
in Rule 21.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) . See also State v.
DePlonty. 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987).

(For further insight into

legislative intent, see "Report on the Insanity Defense in Criminal
Prosecution and Proposed Legislation" from the Task Force Committee
on Insanity Defense, dated December 27, 1982, attached hereto as
Addendum B.)
While there is case law pertaining to involuntary intoxication
from other jurisdictions which focuses on the ability of the
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law, such cases are
readily distinguishable. Those jurisdictions have either codified
the defense of involuntary intoxication, as is the case in Colorado
[Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-804 (1986)], or they still adhere to the
Model Penal Code or common law test for insanity, so that their
standard for involuntary intoxication is consistent with their
insanity statutes or rules. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on
Criminal Law § 45 at 347 (1972) (involuntary intoxication is "a
defense if it puts the defendant in such a state of mind, e.g., so
that he does not know the nature and quality of his act or know
that his act is wrong, in a jurisdiction which has adopted the
M'Naghten test for insanity") (emphasis added).
As

indicated

above,

Utah

no

longer

follows

the

M'Naghten/"irresistible impulse" test, having enacted a strict mens
rea mental defense statute in 1983 (§ 76-2-305) which exclusively
governs all mental illness defenses.
11

Further, there is no common law defense of involuntary
intoxication available in Utah.
568, 573-574 (Utah 1991)

See State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d

(common law defenses abolished in 1973

when legislature enacted the Utah Criminal Code).

The defense of

involuntary intoxication is therefore governed by section 76-2-305
and not by any other legal standard, as the trial court properly
ruled,
B.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT UTAH HAS
ABOLISHED THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE DEFENSE

A defendant has no constitutional right to an "irresistible
impulse" defense.

Leland v. Oregon. 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002,

96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952).

It is a creation of either statute or, in

some states, common law.

As such, it can be changed through

legislation, as has occurred not only in Utah, but in other states
as well.

Hart v. State. 702 P.2d 651, 659 (Alaska App. 1985)

(state may constitutionally eliminate from its insanity defense
"irresistible impulse" or inability to conform one's conduct to
requirements of the law.)

Also, in 1984, the Congress of the

United States abolished the volitional prong (ability to conform
one's conduct to requirements of law) of the Model Penal Code by
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 17.
Defendant's reference to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-804 (1986)
does not advance his argument (Br. of Appellant at 10).

Colorado

has a different legal standard for involuntary intoxication and for
insanity than Utah.

Defendant undoubtedly prefers Colorado law,

but it is not relevant to his case, and his argument is more
appropriately directed to the Legislature. Citation to statutes or
12

case decisions from jurisdictions which adhere to legal standards
which are different than Utah's is not helpful.
The only Utah case which touches on involuntary intoxication
is State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981).

The Court stated in

dicta that "when intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntarily
produced, negates the existence of the state of mind required for
the commission of the crime, the act or omission which otherwise
would constitute an offense is purged of its criminality."

Id. at

79. The case does not discuss irresistible impulse or the ability
to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law.

Rather, the

relevant inquiry is whether the defendant was able to form the mens
rea specified in the criminal statute.
The trial
indicated

court's

above,

the

order properly
Utah

Legislature

stated Utah law.
in

1983

As

specifically

abolished the "irresistible impulse" defense, as did Congress and
a number of state legislatures.
Had

the

trial

court

in

the

instant

case

ruled

that

irresistible impulse was an available defense, and had the court so
instructed the jury at trial, it would have constituted error. See
State v. Tost. 424 A.2d 293, 296, 297 (Conn. 1979) ("the commingling
of old common-law rules with the statutory rule, could only create
confusion as to what was the correct standard for determining
insanity"; "the only standard by which to determine insanity as a
defense to a crime is that found in [the criminal statutes]").

13

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that
the Court affirm defendant's conviction for first degree murder.

DATED this / 3 ^ day of ^cri/C^J^2^i^

, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
^

CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, to Alan D. Boyack,
attorney for defendant, at 205 East Tabernacle Street, St. George,
Utah 84770, this j5_

day of

^fUn/^My&^^

r^^CU/^.rjn-
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, 1992.

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

jl G3T 21 PR 1 35

Eric A. Ludlow #5104
Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

-vs-

)

ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD
APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
(Nunc Pro Tunc Order to
correct typographical error)

)

JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR.,
)

Criminal No. 901502200

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on
the 26th day of November, 1991, on State's motion for pretrial
determination of the legal standard applicable to the defense of
involuntary intoxication, and the Defendant being present and
represented by Alan D. Boyack, the Plaintiff being represented by
Eric A. Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, and both Counsel having
indicated the desire for a pretrial determination of the applicable
legal standard, and the Court having allowed supplemental briefing
at the Defendant's request; the Court, having now reviewed the
memoranda and supplemental memoranda of the parties, hereby issues
the

following

order

pertaining

to

the

legal

standards

and

principles applicable to the case as follows:
1. Involuntary intoxication leading to temporary mental
illness can constitute a defense, if brought within the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(1), which governs all mental illness

defenses

by

its

very

terms.

["it

is

a

defense

to

a

prosecution — that the defendant, as a result of mental illness,
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged.

Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.11]
2.

Irresistible impulse, or a determination of whether

a defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law, is no longer the legal standard applicable
to a mental illness defense in Utah, since the Utah Legislature in
enacting the present law

(L. 1983, ch. 49, § 1) specifically

repealed the former test for insanity, which then included lacking
substantial

capacity

"to

conform

[one's]

conduct

to

the

requirements of law." (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-305).
3. By statute, voluntary intoxication cannot constitute
a complete defense to any crime which contains as an element of the
charge or of a lesser included offense the culpable mental state of
recklessness or of criminal negligence. [Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306
provides

that

"...if

recklessness

or

criminal

negligence

establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of
the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense."]
4.

Mental illness induced by voluntary intoxication is

not a defense in Utah.

["A person who is under the influence of

voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not

2

excused

from criminal

illness."

responsibility

on the basis

of mental

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(3).]'
Nunc Pro Tunc order
DATED this 8th day of January, 1992.

J / / PHILIP
¥i£th D i s t r i c t Court Judge

-iKlLJfJlAH

)

; 0 U W OF WASHINGTON)M
certify fhattw* document
trufe copy * Xr original document or> flic In
Cterk'i otlic.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

^^QlD^

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION AND STIPULATION TO
CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN
COURT'S ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD
APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

Plaintiff,
-vsJOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR.,

Criminal No. 901502200
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.

The State hereby moves the Court for a nunc pro tunc
order correcting a typographical error which exists in its Order
Re:

Legal

Standard

Applicable

to

Defense

of

Involuntary

Intoxication, dated January 8, 1992, for the following reasons:
1. The parties stipulate that paragraph 3 of the Court's
order should begin with the words "Voluntary intoxication" rather
than "Involuntary intoxication," and that the present order reads
incorrectly due to a typographical error.

The parties further

agree to and request a nunc pro tunc order dated January 8, 1992.
2.

Paragraph #3 of the Court's order begins, "By

statute, involuntary intoxication cannot

constitute—"

That

language tracked page 7, paragraph #3 of the State's Supplemental
Memorandum

of Points and Authorities Re: Legal

Standard for

Involuntary Intoxication, which begins, "Voluntary intoxication
cannot by statute constitute..."
3. The present wording of paragraph #3 of the order is
internally

inconsistent

because

it

refers

to

involuntary

intoxication while citing the statute pertaining to voluntary
intoxication (Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306).
4.

The order is the subject of a present appeal before

the Utah Supreme Court in this case, and needs to be corrected for
purposes of appellate review.
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the Court
sign the attached nunc pro tunc Order Re: Legal Standard Applicable
to Defense of Involuntary Intoxication and direct the Clerk of the
Court to certify this motion and the accompanying order, and
forward them to the Utah Supreme Court after that Court grants the
State's Motion to Supplement the Record.
DATED

this

1992.

ERIC A. LUDLOW \ %
Washington County Attorney

CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General

KEVIN L. MCCLOSKEY
^
Assistant Attorney-General

^

s

STIPULATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
I hereby stipulate to the correction in the Court's Order
Re:

Legal

Standard

Applicable

to

Defense

of

Involuntary

Intoxication according to the terms and for the reasons set out
above, and further stipulate that the Court may enter a nunc pro
tunc order dated January 8, 1992.

ALAN D . ~ B O Y K C K ~ 7
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
Of the foregoing MOTION AND STIPULATION TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL
ERROR IN COURT'S ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION, postage prepaid, to the following this
Ek day of (Ja>hL^je^^
1992:
Alan D. Boyack
Attorney at Law
205 East Tabernacle, #203
St. George, Utah 84770

BOUNTY OF WASHINCftON)
l, the undwsignedt.Ct^of the
i»TH CflSTRi^ p6UMripertKy that th4i documen.
* trufccopy oi »bp wwto\ document on file In
j>Cterk'iofflct *-^JV._-H"WITNESS) wy hand and jfeat^f the court

:
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ADDENDUM B

TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY DEFENSE

A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Robert 6. Campbell/ Jr., Chairman
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq.
Dr. Lincoln Clark
Earl R. Doriue, Esq.
J. Thomas Greene, Esq.
Dr. Bernard Grosser
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq.
Dr. Louis G. Moench
Robert J. Stansfield, Esq.
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow
Robert Van Sciver, Esq.
K. Robert Wright, Esq.
December 27, 1982

A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The problem of insanity and the criminal defendant has been
• matter of concern almost since the inception of criminal prosecutions. Early in the development of the English criminal law
it vas ruled that a criminal act could not be punished if the
actor had no more mental capacity then a "wild beast" or did not
know "good from evil." As the judicial and medical communities
acquired more sophistication concerning the mentally disturbed
offender, the courts grappled with the issue of whether the
ancient tests ought to be retained. In 1843, thirteen judges of
the Queens Bench in England promulgated the so-called M'Neghten
test in assessing whether the court that had acquitted Daniel
M'Kaghten in the killing of the Secretary to the Prime Minister of
England had acted erroneously.
1«

The M'Naghten Rule.

The test for insanity as articulated by the English judges
was that if a defendant, because of a defect in reason due to
a disease of the mind, did not know the quality of his act or
know that it was wrong, he was entitled to be acquitted. The
standard was adopted at a time when the English courts had not
fully developed the concept of "criminal intent" or the state of
mind necessary to convict of certain offenses. The test of
insanity was independent of the mental stete required for the
offense and made the concept of insanity an affirmative defense.
The M'Kaghten test was soon adopted in the United States and
became the standard defense of insanity in almost all jurisdictions in this country.
2*

Irresistible Impulse Test.

After M'Kaghten had been utilized for a number of years,
some courts supplemented the M'Kaghten standard by the so-called
"irresistible impulse" test. That standard provided that if a
criminal actor could not conform his conduct to the right he was
entitled to acquittal. Utah adopted the modification of the
M'Kaghten rule and it remained the law in the State of Utah up
until 1973, when the Utah Criminal Code was modified to adopt a
new standard.

Other courts continued to struggle with the K'Kaghten formula and its modification*, and in 1954 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the socalled Durham test for insanity, which would exonerate a defendant if his criminal conduct was the product of a mental disease
er defect. Moat states rejected this experimentation as being
too vague and too open-ended, and several years later the court
that first Articulated the test rejected it.
3.

All and Utah Rule.

In the meantime, the American Law Institute promulgated a
new test for the insanity defense which was a modified version
ef the M'Kaghten rule plus irresistible istpulae test that had
been in effect in seme states including Utah. Sbe new version
further expanded the insanity defense by providing that a person
was not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the tim* ef such
eonduct, as a result ef mental disease er defect, the actor lacked
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the lew.
tThis standard ves adopted by statute in the State ef Utah in 1973.
($ 76-2-305, Utah Code Ann. 1953). Further, in the State ef Utah,
the burden ef proof is en the prosecution, when any evidence ef
insanity is raised, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that at
the time the defendant committed the criminal act be was legally
sane. In other states that burden is east en the defendant.
4.

Utah Law Compered to that in Bincklev.

The law in the State ef Utah ia today identical to the law
existing in the District ef Columbia as it was applied in the
criminal prosecution against John Hinckley for the attempted
assassination of President Reagan. Although the Hinckley eaae has
awakened public concern with the insanity defenae, many lawyers,
psychiatrists and scholars have been disenchanted with both the
M'Kaghten standard and the American Lav Institute standard for some
time. An extensive review ef the legal and psychiatric literature
discussing the insanity defenae has been made by the committee.
Although only a small percentage of criminal cases involve instances
where the defense ef insanity is elaimed, that fact is no justification for perpetuating an erroneous legal standard if, in fact,
an erroneous legal standard haa been adopted.
After extensive study, the committee concluded that the
current test for insanity in the State ef Utah was conceptually
erroneous* She error was not so much in the action taken by the
American Law Institute as it was in the original concept of the
insanity defense as outlined by the thirteen English judges in
the M'Kaghten eaae. She committee has concluded that the question that the jury or judge ought to address is whether the criminal dmfmnSmnt at the time ef the eenaissien of the act had the
required state of mind defined for the commission of the offense.

Zf a mental disease or defect precluded the defendant from entertaining the state of mind required for the offense charged, the
defendant would be entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense
and either a conviction should be entered on a lesser included
offense for which the defendant did have the requisite state of
mind, or if no such state of mind existed, the defendant should
be acquitted Altogether.
The defendant who is mentally illr but not without the power
to form the required criminal intent, ought to be convicted the
same as any other defendant who committed a crime with the
requisite state of mind. Such a conceptualization makes the
claim of mental illness relevant to the state of mind of the
defendant at the time of the commission of the offense, just as
if the defendant had raised defenses other than mental illness,
such as mistake of fact or lack of intent or any ether condition
that would cause a judge or jury to find that the defendant did
not commit the offense charged. The insanity defense would no
longer be an affirmative defense to be considered by the trier
of fact independent of the defendant's state of mind. The burden,
of course, would be on the prosecution, as it now is, to show
that the defendant acted with the required criminal intent but
there would be no other burden required to be met by the prosecution,
nor would there be any other legal concept for the jury to consider?
This standard has ^tn proposed by eminent scholars throughout
the United States and is reflected in proposed legislation currently before Congress, and legislation that has been before
Congress in one form or another since If73. This conceptual format has recently been adopted in one form or another with the
same effect in the Stat' .4of Idaho, Montana and Alabama.
5.

Committee Recommendation.

The committee recommended that the standard for determining
whether a defendant should be convicted of an offense, although
mentally ill, would be whether
•as a result of the mental illness [the
defendant] lacked the mental state required
as an element of the offense charged.*
Mental illness would not otherwise constitute a defense and
the term mental illness would not include voluntary intoxication.
Mental illness would include a mental disease or defect. The
legislation proposed by the committee would authorize a specific
plea of "not guilty due to mental illness" and invoke procedures
for examination of a defendant by qualified experts to determine
the condition of the defendant at the time of the commission of
the offense. The so-called battle of the psychiatrists would
not be entirely eliminated, but it would be significantly reduced
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because the scope of psychiatric opinion would consider only the
question of whether the defendant had the required criminal state
of mind, and would not consider what the committee believes to be
the unanswerable question as to volition.
If, however, there ever were a defendant with such a deranged
condition that he absolutely could not control his behavior
(although he knew what he was doing), his actions would not be
"voluntary acts" within the requirement of the Utah Penal Code
(S 76-1-601(1), Utah Code Ann. 1953). Zt is unlikely, in any
•vent, that any such person would ever be brought to trial. The
affect of the new test for insanity would be to narrow the defense
from its current broad standard to one examining the mental state
of the defendant at the time that the act was committed, and to
harmonize it with the prosecution's burden in every criminal ease.
The total abolition of any consideration of mental illness or
insanity would, in the committee's opinion, be unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the defendant who raises a defense of mental illness
on the issue of the requisite state of mind cannot be deprived of
the opportunity to offer relevant evidence on the issue. To do so
would treat the mentally ill defendant in a different classification from other defendants who might also raise the defense of the
lack of required state of mind and the disparate treatment would
deny such defendant the equal protection of the law.
The committee also recommends that changes be made in the
Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to harmonize the new
mental illness concept with required court procedures, including
the requirement that notice be given not only of a elaim of total
exoneration due to mental illness, but of any claim of diminished
capacity. The defendant could enter a plea that he lacked the
required mental capacity, or in the alternative, could deny the
commission of the offense itself. (This could occur in a homicide
ease where a defendant contends that he was so mentally ill as to
be unable to form the required state of mind for the commission
of the offense, but that if he had the required state of mind to
commit the offense, he was privileged to act as he did due to
self-defense.)
6.

'Guilty and Mentally 111" Concept.

The committee believes that the proposed legislation would
significantly improve the administration of justice in instances
where mental illness is an issue in a criminal prosecution. Xn
order to deal with the instances where a defendant may be mentally
ill, but not so ill as to be free from criminal responsibility,
the committee proposes that the concept of "guilty and mentally
ill" be added to Utah law to deal with a special class of offenders.

This concept has currently been adopted in some form by the
legialaturea of at leaat ten atatas. The committee did not parrot
the legislative format in any state, but tailored the proposal to
what was 'believed to be the best consensus of all the legislation
and one compatible with and in keeping with the available resources
in the State of Utah.
Accordingly, under the Committee proposal, f 77-13-1, Utah
Code Ann. (1953) would be amended to include five possible pleas
to the.offence charged. In addition to the pleas of-not guilty,
'guilty and*no contest currently provided for under the statute, a
defendant could enter a plea of "not guilty by reason of mental
illness," or "guilty and mentally ill." If a defendant enters a
plea.of not guilty by reason of mental illness, as previously
explained, he would place in issue the question of whether his
alleged mental illness precluded him from entertaining the state
of mind required for the offense charged. (A defendant would be
allowed to plead not guiltyt or in the alternative, net guilty by
reason of mental illness.)
If, on the other hand, a defendant enters a plea of "guilty
and mentally ill," such would not exonerate or exeuse defendant's
conduct. The offender found "guilty and mentally ill" is a person
responsible for his criminal activities and held accountable for
such under the law, but who may need specialized treatment.
Zn view of the additional pleas authorized under the Committee
proposal, the Committee also recommends amendment of $ 77-35-21(a)
to allow the jury, in addition to a verdict of guilty or not guilty,
to return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of mental illness,"
"guilty and mentally ill," "not guilty of the crime charged but
guilty of a lesser included offense," or "not guilty of the crime
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill."
7.

Procedure upon Entry of a Plea of "Guilty and Mentally 111."

If a defendant proffers a plea of guilty and mentally ill,
the Court will hold a hearing to determine the claims of mental
illness, and may order an evaluation of defendant by a suitable
medical facility. If the trial judge finds that the defendant was
mentally ill within the definition of that term, the judge could
then dispose of the offender through various alternatives that
would insure some degree of special custody and/or treatment. If
the judge found that the defendant was not mentally ill, the guilty
plea remains and the defendant would be sentenced as any other
offender.
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If the defendant enteri a plea of "not guilty by reason of
mental illness," a jury could also receive evidence that the
defendant, vas currently mentally ill* as veil as at the time ef
the commieaion of the offense, and could return a verdict of
"guilty and mentally ill".. However, the jury's verdict would be
subject to a post-verdict hearing and the court would be required
to confirm that the defendant was, in fact, currently mentally ill.
If the defendant was found to be mentally ill, the eourt could then
dispose of the case by sentencing the offender to the term provided by law, but the offender could be institutionaliied or dealt
with in a more'sultable custodial or therapeutic setting.
~~~
The criteria for defining a person "guilty and mentally ill,"
and thereby subject to the special disposition by the court, have
been carefully and narrowly drawn so as not to overload the mental
health system which already has limited resources. Only those
offenders who meet a carefully selected mix of criteria would be
eligible for this special disposition. This process allows for
the identification, confirmation and disposition of those special
offenders who should not be excused from criminal responsibility
but who should be recognized as having special needs reguiring"a
particular type of custody or treatment.
An offender found guilty and mentally ill would not be
released from serving his sentence unless the Board of Pardons
determined, under criteria normally applied by the Beard, that
the person should be released. Additionally, if the Board considers a defendant for parole, it must consult with the treating
facility, and upon recommendation ef the facility, will make
continued treatment a condition of parole. A person determined
to be guilty and mentally ill who is in need ef further institutionalization beyond the period provided by the criminal offense
for which he was convicted should be certified for commitment
through civil process.
Studies that have been done ef the application ef the "guilty
and mentally ill" concept in other jurisdictions have shown that
it does not overburden the system, does not provide an excuse for
juries to convict when they shouldn't, and is not used to excuse
a defendant's conduct. The concept appears to have been especially
promising in the State of Michigan.
8.

Conclusion.

The concepts that the Committee has recommended for legislative
adoption have been thoughtfully considered. They are based upon
considerations of scholarly analysis, empirical research reports,
multi-disciplinary input, and sources outside of the Committee,

itself, which have been carefully and intelligently advanced by
persons interested in this subject matter. It is believed that
the Committee report reflects the best thinking of the legal and
mental health community in the state and is corroborated by
similar conclusions from others in Utah and in other parts of the
country. Therefore, the Committee respectfully recommends to the
Legislature the adoption of the attached legislation relating to
the issue of insanity and mental illness in criminal cases as
proposed by the Committee.
TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY
DEFENSE
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Chairman
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq.
•Dr. Lincoln Clark
Earl R. Dorius, Esq.
J. Thomas Greene, Esq.
Dr. Bernard Grosser
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq.
**Dr. Louis G. Moeneh
••Robert J, Stansfield, Esq.
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow
••Robert Van Seiver, Esq.
K. Robert Wright, Esq.

•Concurs in amendment of Section 76-2-305, but dissents from
remainder of Committee Report and Recommendation. The Chairman
believes that this position is .sound and very possibly, preferable.
••Dissents from Committee Report and Recommendation.
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